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Abstract 
Background: Excessive alcohol use contributes to public nuisance, anti-social behaviour, and 
domestic, interpersonal and sexual violence. We test whether licensing policies aimed at 
restricting its spatial and/or temporal availability, including cumulative impact zones, are 
associated with reductions in alcohol-related crime. 
Methods: Reported crimes at English lower tier local authority (LTLA) level were used to 
calculate rates of reported crimes including alcohol-attributable rates of sexual offenses and 
violence against the person, and public order offenses. Financial fraud was included as a control 
crime not directly associated with alcohol abuse. Each area was classified as to its cumulative 
licensing policy intensity for 2009-2015 and categorised as ’passive’, low, medium or high. 
Crime rates adjusted for area deprivation, outlet density, alcohol-related hospital admissions 
and population size at baseline were analysed using hierarchical (log-rate) growth modelling. 
Results: 284 of 326 LTLAs could be linked and had complete data. From 2009 to 2013 alcohol 
related violent and sexual crimes and public order offenses rates reduces faster in areas with 
more ‘intense’ policies (about 1.2, 0.10, and 1.7 per 1,000 people compared to 0.6, 0.01, and 
1.0 in ‘passive’ areas, respectively). Post-2013, recorded rates increased rapidly again. No 
trends were observed for financial fraud. 
Conclusions: Local areas in England with more intense alcohol licensing policies had a 
stronger decline in rates of violent crimes, sexual crimes and public order offences in the period 
up to 2013 of the order of 4-6% greater compared to areas where these policies were not in 
place, but not thereafter. 
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What is already known about this subject? 
Excessive alcohol consumption is associated wider negative societal impacts such as anti-social 
behaviour and violence. All local authorities in England operate under the same policy 
framework aimed at the prevention of crime and disorder, public safety, prevention of public 
nuisance, and protection of children from harm. Local differences in how best to address these, 
result in variation in local alcohol licensing policies which could result in different impacts on 
crime rates. 
 
What this study adds? 
This paper shows that alcohol-licensing policies in local government areas in England can have 
a measurable impact on reducing acute negative societal impacts of excessive alcohol 
consumption. It demonstrates that the intensity and effectiveness of the local licencing policies, 
including the use of cumulative impact zones, was associated with higher reduction in local 
rates of violent crimes, sexual crimes and public order offences in the period up to 2013; which 
was not observed for a negative control not associated with alcohol use. After 2013 however, 
for a variety of reasons, rates started to increase again. 
 
 
  
Introduction 
Excessive alcohol consumption is known to have not only a negative effect on the health of the 
individual, but also has wider negative societal impacts such as public nuisance, anti-social 
behaviour, and violence including domestic, interpersonal and sexual [1-7].  
In England and Wales, guidance issued in 2005 [8] extended the 2003 Licensing Act [9] around 
the four statutory licensing objectives: (1) the prevention of crime and disorder, (2) public 
safety, (3) the prevention of public nuisance, and (4) the protection of children from harm. This 
gives local authorities discretionary powers to develop cumulative impact policies, in which, 
in specific designated areas (cumulative impact zones (CIZ)), the burden of proof during 
licensing decisions is reversed in that applications for new licenses will be refused unless the 
applicant can demonstrate they will avoid compromising the licensing objectives. These 
restrictions can take different forms and their implementation varies by local areas [10, 11], 
although they all operate under the same policy framework. Two main policy strategies that 
have been advanced to address alcohol related harms are modifying the price of alcohol, to 
make it less affordable, or restricting its spatial and/or temporal availability [12]. Policies to 
increase the minimum unit price  have not (yet) been implemented [13].  
Public health is not currently included in the statutory licensing objectives. Indeed, the 
guidance [8] specifically states that public health cannot be the primary consideration for a 
licensing decision for individual premises, although it can be used in support of a decision, and 
can be used to support the case for a cumulative impact policy. Nonetheless, we have shown 
that the intensity of local licensing policies and enforcement, defined as willingness to 
implement cumulative impact policies and refusal of license applications, was associated with 
a stronger reduction in alcohol related hospital admissions over time [14].  
Given that the licensing objectives do include the prevention of crime and disorder, public 
safety and the prevention of public nuisance specifically, a direct effect on alcohol-related 
crime rates would similarly be expected, but no studies of the effect of policies themselves on 
crime outcomes – other than through specific mediating factors such as outlet density [15, 16] 
– have been conducted. In this paper we test whether local licensing policies are associated 
with reduction in alcohol related crime.  
 
Materials and Methods 
Data 
Quarterly data of reported crimes at lower tier local authority (LTLA) level for England (i.e. 
55 unitary authorities, City of London and Isles of Scilly, 201 non-metropolitan districts, 36 
metropolitan boroughs and 32 London boroughs) were obtained from the UK Office of 
National Statistics [17] up to the year 2015. Alcohol related sexual offenses and alcohol-related 
violence against the person (with or without injury) have been calculated by multiplying the 
reported counts by their Alcohol- Attributable Fraction (AAF). Based on the Local Alcohol 
Profiles for England (http://www.lape.org.uk/), AAFs of 13% and 37% are used to calculate 
alcohol-related sexual offenses and alcohol-related violence against the person, respectively 
[18] (i.e. 13% of all sexual offences and 37% of all violent offences are assumed to be directly 
attributable to alcohol consumption). The resulting offence counts were then divided by the 
corresponding LTLA population sizes for the corresponding year obtained from the UK Office 
of National Statistics [19] to obtain rates per 1,000 people.  
We similarly obtained reported counts of public order offenses, shoplifting, possession of a 
weapon, drug offenses and domestic burglaries and calculated annual area rates for each LTLA. 
Although for the vast majority of crimes these are not attributable to alcohol use, they do 
correlate (cluster) with alcohol related sexual and violent offenses at area level. We did not 
multiple these by an AAF since these were not specifically provided in [18]. 
‘Financial fraud’ is a crime we classified, a priori, as not being caused by alcohol consumption, 
and using the same methodology as above we generated area-level annual rates for these as 
well as for this “control crime”.  
These data were further linked at LTLA level to 2009/10 deprivation data (measured using the 
Index of Multiple Deprivation) also obtained from the Office of National Statistics [20], and to 
alcohol outlet density which was obtained from two commercial market research companies 
who maintain national databases of licensed and trading outlets selling alcohol. Outlet density 
was calculated as the number of outlets within 1km of the address-weighted centroid of each 
postcode: subsequently for each Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) the average of the outlet 
counts within the constituent postcodes, weighted by the corresponding census population of 
each postcode, was calculated, and these were averaged across all constituent LSOAs to obtain 
a measure of outlet density for each LTLA. Conceptually this measure captures the average 
number of outlets within walking distance of an individual within the LTLA. 
LTLAs were coded for alcohol policy intensity based on a metric described and used in a 
previous publication [14]. In short, data on the presence of cumulative impact zones and on 
successful challenges of licenses for new premises in LTLAs were extracted from the 
2007/2008 and 2011/2012 alcohol licensing data collected in the Home Office’s ‘Alcohol and 
Late Night Refreshment Licensing England and Wales data’ [21]. Both variables were recoded 
to present (1) or absent (0) and for each year added together to derive a 3-level score that we 
interpreted as an indication of how active an area’s alcohol policy was. We developed a 
cumulative policy intensity index, which was derived by adding up annual scores for each year 
and subsequently categorizing them in four categories (’passive’, low, medium and high) based 
on quartiles of the distribution. This metric was derived to account for the cumulative effect of 
a policy over time. 
There are a total of 326 LTLAs, or districts, in England in 2014, but we were only able to link 
data for 312 areas; either because of missing data or because of boundary changes within the 
analysis period. In addition, initial sensitivity analysis identified three areas (City of London, 
City of Westminster and Isles of Scilly) with consist high residuals in the statistical models 
(using an a priori cut-off +/- 0.5 in multiple years), and these outliers which were removed 
prior to analyses. We only included areas with complete data for the years 2009-2015 and 
excluded areas with less than 24 data points (i.e. <6 years of data), resulting in a final dataset 
of 284 local areas for which we had all data.  
 
Statistical analyses 
The data were analysed statistically using growth curve analysis in R statistical software [22]. 
Crime rates were log-transformed and associated to a set of explanatory variables; that is, a 
log-rate model [23]. Variability between LTLAs at baseline and individual LTLA time trends 
were modelled by means of hierarchical random intercept-random slopes mixed-effects models 
with quarter (e.g. January–March to October–December) included as a covariate to account for 
seasonal trends. When there was evidence of temporal non-linearity quadratic and cubic fits 
were also explored. Model fit was evaluated based on magnitude and patterns in model 
residuals, evaluation of Gaussian assumptions of parameter estimates and Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC), since all models were considered equally probably a priori.  
 
Results 
Of the 284 areas with complete covariate data for 2009-2014, 171 (60%) had some form of 
active policy in place as characterized by our index (i.e. having a CIZ in the area, having 
rejected new alcohol license applications, or both) in 2009 (Table 1). With respect to the 
covariate distribution across the four levels of our alcohol policy intensity index, areas with 
more active policies had at baseline, on average, higher levels of area deprivation, density of 
alcohol outlets, alcohol-related hospital admissions, and population size.  
Tables 2-4 show three versions of our statistical models each, describing increasing 
complexity, for alcohol-related violent crime rates, alcohol-related sexual crime rates and 
public order offenses, respectively. Here we will describe the results of the most complex 
model since here confounder adjustment is most comprehensive. Observed temporal trends 
were best described as quadratic functions. 
Table 2 describes the results for alcohol-related violent crime rates (with and without personal 
injury) and indicates that the more intense policies were implemented in the areas with the 
highest rates. Reported alcohol-related violent crime rates had been reducing until about 2013, 
but have increased since (Figure 1). Their initial decline was statistically significantly different, 
and steepest, in areas with a more intense alcohol policy compared to the other areas. However, 
after 2013 reported rates in all areas increased again, and did so faster in areas with more intense 
alcohol policies, as indicated by the quadratic term. Quantitatively, the effects are relatively 
moderate and indicate that in the most ‘intense’ areas registered alcohol-related violent crime 
rates reduced from about 6.1 per 1,000 people in 2009 to 4.9 in 2013 (and back to 5.2 in 2014) 
compared to a reduction from 3.9/1,000 in 2009 to 3.3 in 2013 (and to 3.5 in 2014) in the 
‘passive’ areas on average, respectively. 
Table 3 and Figure 1 similarly describe the results for alcohol-related sexual crimes. The more 
intense policies were implemented in the areas where baseline sex crime rates were higher. Up 
until 2013, the rates decreased more in areas with increasing policy intensity (about 0.10 per 
1,000 people across the period in ‘passive areas compared to a reduction from 0.15 to 0.14 per 
1,000 in the most ‘intense areas). Similar to the above results for violent crimes however, the 
rate of reported crimes increased most rapidly post-2013 in the areas with the most intense 
policy.  
We found a similar pattern with a stronger reduction in areas with more ‘intense’ alcohol 
policies for public order offenses up to 2013 (Table 4; Figure 1), but in contrast to alcohol-
related violent and sexual crimes a the steep increase post-2013 was absent. More specifically, 
registered rates reduced from 2.6 to 1.6 per 1,000 people in the passive areas compared to an 
average decrease from 4.6 to 2.9 per 1,000 in the most ‘intense’ areas.  
We compared these results directly with observed trends of ‘financial fraud’, which a priori 
we classified as not being caused by alcohol consumption and we interpreted as a ‘control 
crime’ (Table 5; Figure 1). Interestingly, higher rates of financial fraud were present in areas 
with more intense alcohol policies, which may be associated with the area’s level of economic 
activity, and is comparable to the levels observed for alcohol-related crimes. However, policy-
related time trends that were observed for alcohol-related crimes were absent for financial 
fraud. 
In addition to the “control crime”, we similarly modelled temporal trends in rates of domestic 
burglaries, shoplifting, possession of weapons and drug offenses; offenses which, although not 
directly caused by alcohol consumption, are likely cluster in similar areas. We observe similar 
patterns up to 2012, but do not, or only to a very limited extent, observe post-2013 increases in 
rates (Online Supplementary Materials Table S1). 
Since the observed non-linear trends are difficult to assess and compare, Figure 2 shows the 
average difference between the areas with the most intense licensing policy compared to the 
areas with no, or passive, licensing policies with respect to crime rates over time (e.g. 
‘inequality’ expressed as a ratio relative to baseline year 2009) for all crimes. As shown, 
inequality decreased (i.e. ratio <1) for all alcohol-related crimes as well as the alcohol-
correlated crimes in the period up to about 2013, while this is not the case for financial fraud. 
Note that, as shown in Figure 1, this is because crime in highest intensity areas reduces faster 
than in passive areas; not because crime rates in passive areas increase faster. Post-2012/13, 
‘inequality’ increases again, especially for alcohol-related sexual crimes and to a lesser extent 
for violent crimes, but stabilizes or reduces slower for public order offenses, domestic burglary, 
drug offenses, possession of weapons and shoplifting.  
 
Discussion 
These analyses aimed to investigate whether a higher alcohol licensing policy intensity , as 
characterized by the absence of a CIZ and whether new premises licenses had been rejected, 
was associated with alcohol-related violent crimes, alcohol-related sex crimes, and public order 
offenses in a similar way as previously observed for alcohol-related hospital submissions [14]. 
Observed temporal trends were not linear across the time period covered, complicating the 
interpretation of the results in relation to the impact of alcohol licensing policies. Nonetheless, 
we found stronger reductions in registered alcohol-related violent crimes, alcohol-related 
sexual crimes, and public order offenses in areas with more intense alcohol policies and 
enforcement in the order of an additional 4-6% decrease compared to what would be expected 
had no policies been in place. Post-2013 however, rates started to increase again. With respect 
to absolute differences however, there is evidence of substantial underreporting of crimes with 
the ratio of actual (estimated) to reported crime being different for different classes of crimes 
and ranging from 1:1 (for homicides) to over 1:10 for sexual crimes and shoplifting, making 
interpretation of absolute effects difficult [24]. Our study does not allow us to draw any firm 
conclusions about causality, but we do observe that roughly comparable patterns are observed 
for crimes we would expect to cluster in the same areas as alcohol-related crimes, while no 
trends are observed for financial fraud, which as a priori we defined as a “control crime”.  
To calculate the alcohol-related violent and sex crime rates we used the methodology employed 
by the Local Alcohol Profiles for England (LAPE) [18], who used alcohol-attributable fractions 
(AAF) to estimate the alcohol-related fraction of total reported crimes. These are fixed fractions 
derived from available literature, but nonetheless because these are fixed they are not specific 
enough to look at specific trends in alcohol-related crimes since AAF do not vary between 
LTLAs or over time; which are obviously affected by many other things in society. The most 
obvious example of this is the Metropolitan Police’s highly publicised investigation into sex 
offences (‘Operation Yewtree’) which resulted in improvements in recording as well as greater 
willingness of victims to report sexual crimes from 2012 onwards rather than an actual increase 
in incidence [25]. More specific data are available from the Crime Survey for England and 
Wales (CSEW) for only a limited number of territorial police forces where whether a crime 
was alcohol-related was noted in the data for each crime individually, and for these data up to 
2014 a continuing downwards trend in numbers of reported violent crimes where the victim 
believed the offender(s) to be under the influence of alcohol [26] is indicated. It is important to 
realize that reported crime rates are a fraction of the actual crime rates in the community, and 
the ratio between the two is likely to vary between types of crime, local areas and over time 
[24], while recording practices have also changed over time [27, 28]. It is, however, very 
difficult to disentangle causes of observed trends. Questions have been raised about the quality 
of crime recording and compliance with the Code of Practice for official statistics, while 
alternatively there is some evidence that the in- or decreases in rates may be the result of 
genuine changes in the volume of crime [29, 30]. It should also be noted that different AAFs 
are available from other sources, but these similarly do not vary over the time period covered 
here [31]. Nonetheless, although these issues complicated the statistical modelling, as shown 
by Figure 1, we managed to capture overall trends well assuming a quadratic temporal trend. 
As confirmed by the statistical models, alcohol licensing policies, or in a wider context policies 
to reduce anti-social behaviour, are not introduced in random areas, but are introduced in those 
areas where the cumulative impacts are high. We have adjusted for this in both models by using 
area-level deprivation, population size, alcohol-related hospital admissions and area outlet 
density as markers of societal impact of alcohol consumption, but residual confounding may 
still be present. 
Previous work indicated that spatial autocorrelation of the alcohol policy intensity index was 
negligible [14], so we did not adjust for this in these models, while temporal autocorrelation 
was adjusted for through the use of the hierarchical growth models. Drinking patterns in the 
UK on the other hand, have been shown to differ geographically and over time [32, 33], but we 
did not have the data to take this into account. There is the possibility of ‘spill-over’ effects, in 
which new premises open in or move to surrounding areas with less restrictive licensing 
policies (for example on the border of cumulative impact zones), but data of higher spatial 
granularity would be required to specifically analyse this hypothesis.  
An important strength of this study is that it makes use of routinely collected and publicly 
available data, which enables independent replication. Moreover, the linkage of area-level 
longitudinal data permitted evaluation of time trends in addition to standard cross-sectional 
studies, which is considered to provide better insight in associations between community level 
burdens (from alcohol) and impacts on crime. [4, 34] Another strength of our use of 
longitudinal data in the particular case of recorded crimes is that, despite problems identified 
in the recording of these data, quality will be relatively stable over a 6-year period in each local 
area, enabling analyses of the effect of policies over time without the inference problems from 
which cross-sectional comparisons would suffer. And finally, because we were able to include 
different crimes we were able to evaluate whether observed trends were common features of 
the different policy strata, or instead were related to the actual policies and were not observed 
in non-related crimes (i.e. financial fraud). 
Our analyses confirm previous cross-sectional studies indicating correlations between alcohol 
outlet density, deprivation and crime rates in the UK and elsewhere [1-3, 5, 6, 35], but have 
now also shown reverse association between crime rates and alcohol licensing policy intensity; 
similar to what we observed previously for alcohol-related hospital admissions [14]. Our main 
interest however, was to assess temporal trends, for which there is much less data available; 
especially for the UK [35]. We observed exposure-effect associations showing that areas with 
more intense licensing policies had higher declines in alcohol-related violent and alcohol-
related sex crimes until 2013, which were not observed for financial fraud and confirm findings 
from other geographical regions [36]. The fact we observed similar trends for reported crimes 
not directly related to alcohol consumption but spatially clustered with alcohol-related 
problems, indicate that either alcohol-licensing policies have a wider impact or, and we 
consider this more likely, since the four national licensing objectives include crime and 
disorder, but also public safety, public nuisance and child protection [37] , licensing policies 
are part of a wider package of policies and interventions which together have a wider impact 
than problems from alcohol abuse alone [10]. Indeed, this cumulative burden from various 
problems on a community is the reason local authorities consider implementing a cumulative 
impact zone in an area, and this will include stricter alcohol licensing policies but also can 
include restrictions on other licensable activities (e.g. betting shops and hot food take-aways 
with licenses to operate until late at night) and an increased presence of the police, for example 
[38]. This accords with previous cross-sectional data showing clustering of crime and outlet 
alcohol outlet density [39], and with ONS data indicating that most alcohol-related violent 
incidents occur in the evening or night and at the weekend [26]. It further accords with data 
from the US, in which in a “natural experiment” setting at micro-spatial level the repeal of a 
Sunday alcohol-sales ban was associated with subsequent increase in crime incidents [40]. If 
the above is true, then we hypothesize two potential pathways through which licensing intensity 
leads to reduced crime: (1) more intense licensing leads to less alcohol availability, less (binge) 
drinking and in turn to less alcohol related crime (a pathway from environment to behaviour 
change), and (2) more intense licensing leads to gentrification, leading to compositional 
changes (i.e. different population groups residing in or going to the area) and this in turn results 
in reduced crime rates (a pathway from environment to compositional change to less crime). 
 
Conclusions 
These analyses indicate that local areas in England with more intense alcohol licensing policies 
and enforcement had a stronger decline in rates of violent crimes, sexual crimes and public 
order offenses, at least in the period up to 2013, of the order of 4-6% greater compared to areas 
where these policies were not in place. Post-2012/13, selected crime rates have started to 
increase again, but given that various factors interact, interpretation is difficult.  
These findings are in line with previous findings for alcohol-related hospital admissions, but 
with a still moderate, 2-3 times larger effect. This may be expected, given that licensing policies 
aim to directly affect these crimes within the licensing objectives. Although these results cannot 
be interpreted as causal, they further strengthen the argument about measurable population 
impacts of alcohol licensing policies.  
 
Table 1. Demographics 
Variable  N / mean/ range % 
Total number of local 
authorities 
 
326 100 
Local authority in analyses  284 87 
years  2009-2014  
number of measurements per local authority 24  
Cumulative licensing 
policy index 
Passive 113 40 
Low 41 14 
Medium 83 29 
high 47 17 
outlet density 
Passive 22.2 
P<0.001 
Low 23.5 
Medium 27.8 
high 48.6 
Normalized IMD score 1 
Passive 0.17 
P<0.001 
Low 0.19 
Medium 0.20 
high 0.25 
Population size 
Passive 128,404 
P<0.001 
Low 157,152 
Medium 179,676 
high 252,575 
Alcohol-related hospital 
admissions at baseline 2  
Passive 150 
P<0.001 
Low 151 
Medium 158 
high 163 
1: higher is more deprived; 2 Age-standardized per 100 000 population 
 
 
Table 2. Growth models. 2009-2014 alcohol-related recorded violent crime rate (per 1 000 people) 
Parameter Unadjusted (SE) Adjusted 1 (SE) Adjusted 2 (SE) 
 Linear trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Quadratic trend 
Baseline (yr 2009) 1.592 (0.046)  1.314 (0.077)  1.368(0.117)  
Trend (2009-2014) -0.171 (0.009) 0.015 (0.001) -0.171 (0.009) 0.015 (0.001) -0.177 (0.025) 0.015 (0.002) 
 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 
Effect on intercept        
No policy Ref  ref  ref  
Low policy -0.195 (0.089)  -0.229 (0.079)  -0.208 (0.079)  
Medium  0.147 (0.071)  0.074 (0.063)  0.114 (0.064)  
High policy 0.557 (0.085)  0.302 (0.079)  0.407 (0.085)  
 P<0.001  P<0.001  P<0.001  
Deprivation at baseline   3.031 (0.275)  4.375 (0.461)  
   P<0.001  P<0.001  
Population at baseline   -0.042 (0.016)  -0.171 (0.027)  
   P=0.010  P=0.035  
Outlet density at baseline   0.004 (0.001)  0.002 (0.001)  
   P<0.001  P=0.082  
Alcohol-related hospital 
admissions at baseline 
  -0.002 (0.001)  -0.002 (0.001)  
  P=0.001  P=0.010  
Effects on slope       
Low policy 0.103 (0.017) -0.009 (0.001) 0.103 (0.015) -0.009 (0.001) 0.097 (0.017) -0.008 (0.001) 
Medium  0.032 (0.013) -0.004 (0.001) 0.032 (0.013) -0.004 (0.001) -0.020 (0.014) -0.003 (0.001) 
High policy -0.047 (0.016) 0.004 (0.001) -0.047 (0.016) 0.004 (0.001) -0.078 (0.018) 0.006 (0.002) 
 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 
Deprivation      -0.721 (0.098) 0.080 (0.008) 
     P<0.001 P<0.001 
Population at baseline     0.050 (0.006) -0.005 (0.000) 
     P=0.401 P=0.897 
Outlet density at baseline     0.001 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
     P<0.001 P<0.001 
Alcohol-related hospital 
admissions at baseline  
    0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
    P=0.094 P=0.025 
Variance estimates explained 1 estimates explained 1 estimates explained 1 
Intercept 0.209 13% 0.158 34% 0.157 34% 
Slope 0.003 1% 0.003 1% 0.003 2% 
Residual 0.010 1% 0.010 1% 0.010 3% 
R squared 94.6% 94.6% 94.7% 
All models also adjusted for quarter (i.e. 3 month period) *: P<0.10; **: P<0.05. (1) Explained variance relative to model without explanatory variables (i.e. only time trends as fixed effects) 
Table 3. Growth models. 2009-2014 alcohol-related recorded sex crime rate (per 1 000 people) 
Parameter Unadjusted (SE) Adjusted 1 (SE) Adjusted 2 (SE) 
 Linear trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Quadratic trend 
Baseline (yr 2009) -2.136 (0.051)  -2.476 (0.074)  -1.881 (0.136)  
Trend (2009-2014) -0.144 (0.013) 0.020 (0.001) -0.144 (0.013) 0.020 (0.001) -0.388 (0.037) 0.043 (0.003) 
 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 
Effect on intercept        
No policy ref  ref  ref  
Low policy -0.185 (0.100)  -0.218 (0.093)  -0.167 (0.092)  
Medium  0.116 (0.079)  0.043 (0.074)  0.149 (0.075)  
High policy 0.481 (0.095)  0.245 (0.091)  0.488 (0.099)  
 P<0.001  P<0.001  P<0.001  
Deprivation at baseline   2.361 (0.240)  3.074 (0.535)  
   P<0.001  P<0.001  
Population at baseline   -0.013 (0.014)  -0.204 (0.032)  
   P=0.373  P<0.001  
Outlet density at baseline   0.003 (0.001)  0.002 (0.001)  
   P<0.001  P=0.104  
Alcohol-related hospital 
admissions at baseline 
  -0.001 (0.000)  -0.004 (0.001)  
  P=0.101  P<0.001  
Effects on slope       
Low policy 0.095 (0.025) -0.008 (0.025) 0.095 (0.023) -0.008 (0.002) 0.078 (0.025) -0.007 (0.002) 
Medium  0.034 (0.020) -0.004 (0.002) 0.034 (0.020) -0.004 (0.002) -0.003 (0.020) -0.001 (0.002) 
High policy -0.048 (0.024) 0.004 (0.002) -0.048 (0.024) 0.004 (0.002) -0.136 (0.027) 0.012 (0.002) 
 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 
Deprivation at baseline     -0.319 (0.146) 0.032 (0.014) 
     P=0.029 P=0.019 
Population at baseline     0.062 (0.087) -0.005 (0.001) 
     P<0.001 P<0.001 
Outlet density at baseline     0.001 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
     P=0.060 P=0.011 
Alcohol-related hospital 
admissions at baseline  
    0.001 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
    P<0.001 P<0.001 
Variance  estimates explained 1 estimates explained 1 estimates explained 1 
Intercept 0.218 9% 0.178 25% 0.172 28% 
Slope 0.003 0.3% 0.003 0.3% 0.003 5% 
Residual 0.028 0.4% 0.028 0.4% 0.028 1.5% 
R squared 84.1% 84.1% 84.3% 
All models also adjusted for quarter (i.e. 3 month period) *: P<0.10; **: P<0.05. (1) Explained variance relative to model without explanatory variables (i.e. only time trends as fixed effects) 
Table 4. Growth models. 2009-2014 (alcohol-related) public order offenses (per 1 000 people) 
Parameter Unadjusted (SE) Adjusted 1 (SE) Adjusted 2 (SE) 
 Linear trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Quadratic trend 
Baseline (yr 2009) 1.290 (0.062)  1.010 (0.112)  1.143 (0.172)  
Trend (2009-2014)  -0.227 (0.013) 0.013 (0.001) -0.227 (0.013) 0.013 (0.001) -0.310 (0.037) 0.023 (0.003) 
 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 
Effect on intercept        
No policy ref  ref  ref  
Low policy -0.060 (0.120)  -0.104 (0.118)  -0.068 (0.116)  
Medium  0.141 (0.096)  0.045 (0.094)  0.111 (0.094)  
High policy 0.678 (0.115)  0.338 (0.117)  0.495 (0.124)  
 P<0.001  P=0.010  P<0.001  
Deprivation at baseline   2.536 (0.396)  4.233 (0.676)  
   P<0.001  P<0.001  
Population at baseline   0.012 (0.023)  -0.189 (0.040)  
   P=0.615  P<0.001  
Outlet density at baseline   0.006 (0.001)  0.005 (0.002)  
   P<0.001  P=0.004  
Alcohol-related hospital 
admissions at baseline 
  -0.002 (0.001)  -0.003 (0.001)  
  P=0.11  P=0.027  
Effects on slope       
Low policy 0.069 (0.025) -0.006 (0.002) 0.069 (0.025) -0.005 (0.002) 0.063 (0.025) -0.005 (0.002) 
Medium  0.069 (0.020) -0.007 (0.002) 0.069 (0.020) -0.007 (0.002) 0.055 (0.020) -0.007 (0.002) 
High policy -0.058 (0.024) 0.006 (0.002) -0.058 (0.024) 0.006 (0.002) -0.080 (0.027) 0.006 (0.002) 
 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 P<0.001 
Deprivation at baseline     -1.130 (0.144) 0.135 (0.012) 
     P<0.001 P<0.001 
Population at baseline     0.067 (0.009) -0.005 (0.001) 
     P<0.001 P<0.001 
Outlet density at baseline     0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
     P=0.243 P=0.220 
Alcohol-related hospital 
admissions at baseline  
    0.001 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
    P<0.001 P<0.001 
Variance  estimates explained 1 estimates explained 1 estimates explained 1 
Intercept 0.3703 9% 0.352 14% 0.336 18% 
Slope 0.006 0% 0.006 0% 0.005 7% 
Residual 0.023 3% 0.023 1% 0.022 3% 
R squared 93.2% 93.2% 93.4% 
All models also adjusted for quarter (i.e. 3 month period) *: P<0.10; **: P<0.05. (1)Explained variance relative to model without explanatory variables (i.e. only time trends as fixed effects) 
Table 5. Growth models. Financial fraud rates per 1,000 people (a priori “control”) 2009-2012 data* 
Parameter Financial fraud (SE) 
 Linear trend Quadratic trend 
Baseline ( yr 2009t) 0.502 (0.277)  
Trend (2009-2014) -0.200 (0.115) 0.031 (0.014) 
 P=0.399 P=0.171 
Effect on intercept    
No policy Ref  
Low policy -0.860 (0.186)  
Medium  -0.172 (0.151)  
High policy 0.750 (0.200)  
 P<0.001  
Deprivation  6.409 (1.085)  
 P<0.001  
Population at baseline -0.598 (0.065)  
 P<0.001  
Outlet density at baseline 0.009 (0.003)  
 P<0.001  
Alcohol-related hospital 
admissions at baseline 
-0.008 (0.002)  
P<0.001  
Effects on slope   
Low policy 0.422 (0.077) -0.047 (0.009) 
Medium  0.167 (0.063) -0.020 (0.008) 
High policy -0.187 (0.083) 0.020 (0.010) 
 P<0.001 P<0.001 
Deprivation at baseline -2.514 (0.449) 0.074 (0.045) 
 P=0.044 P<0.001 
Population at baseline 0.291 (0.027) -0.033 (0.003) 
 P<0.001 P<0.001 
Outlet density at baseline -0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 P=0.104 P=0.028 
Alcohol-related hospital 
admissions at baseline  
0.002 (0.001) -0.000 (0.000) 
P=0.019 P=0.001 
Variance  estimates explained 3 
Intercept 0.501 17% 
Slope 0.019 7% 
Residual 0.058 4% 
 85.3% 
*: Post-2012 data not included because reporting changed to national level in 2013 
Figures 
Figure 1. Mean population crime rates (per 1,000 people) and standard errors of measured data and 
modelled estimates of adjusted model 2 (lines) for registered alcohol-related crimes and financial 
fraud. Policy intensity index from ‘passive’ (0) to high (3). 
 
Figure 2. ‘Inequality’, defined as the ratio of annual relative range of local area average crime rates 
between strata of ‘alcohol policy intensity’ relative to baseline year 2009. 
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